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Payments for Environmental Services in German Financial Cooperation 
 
Most of the land in developing and developed countries is privately owned. When private 
landowners make decisions on land use, other stakeholders are affected. How can we design and 
fund financial mechanisms that encourage landowners to manage their resources in a manner that 
benefits society? This article reflects on the experiences of KfW in supporting such mechanisms in 
Latin America, a continent that has been particularly active in developing innovative approaches to 
conservation. It identifies three major challenges – the institutional requirements of setting up such 
mechanisms, the sustainability of impacts on the farm level, and the potential to expand 
environmental impacts by improving cost effectiveness. 
 
Disenchantment with traditional policy 
instruments in natural resources management 
has led policymakers and development agencies 
to look for alternative approaches. One of these 
approaches is paying for environmental 
services: economic incentives instead of 
command and control.  
The concept is intuitively appealing: by offering 
payments to private landowners, the public can 
change the financial rationale behind land use 
decisions that are generally based only on 
private costs and benefits, and induce 
landowners to produce more positive 
externalities or avoid negative ones.  
A simple example would be farmers in an upper 
watershed who are cutting forests, thus 
diminishing the water retention capacity of the 
soil and vegetation and causing irregular water 
flows. Downstream water users might benefit 
from contracting farmers to protect their forest or 
plant new trees. For both parties, the payment 
would have to be more attractive than the 
alternative: lost water services to downstream 
users, agricultural income to upstream 
producers. If the farmers are poor, as those 
working on marginal lands in upper watersheds 
often are, such payments would also contribute 
to reducing poverty. 
 
Small-scale reforestation in a  
PES-type program in Paraguay  
In this survey, we will use a very basic working 
definition of payments for environmental 
services, or PES, including all programs that 
offer cash payments to landowners for changing 
their land use. Many issues discussed here are 
also applicable to programs that offer other 
kinds of incentives to landowners (e.g. 
incentives in kind, or incentives in the form of 
higher prices for products with certain 
environmental characteristics such as FSC-
certified wood).  
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The logic of rewarding or compensating 
landowners for the environmental services they 
perform is not new. An increasing share of the 
agricultural subsidies in developed countries is 
being justified on environmental grounds. 
Development agencies have often provided 
subsidies to farmers for afforestation or similar 
projects. What is new is the explicit use of the 
concept of PES in developing countries, 
particularly in Latin America. The increasing 
recognition of the environmental functions of 
forests, and the services their owners provide to 
the public at the local, national and global level, 
has led to great expectations. Even farmers in 
remote regions have heard that someone might 
pay them for the oxygen their trees will produce.  
In designing new PES systems, it is useful to 
consider the lessons learnt from the first 
generation of programs that paid private 
landowners for changing their land use. In 
German Financial Cooperation (FC), funded by 
the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) and managed by KfW 
Entwicklungsbank (KfW Development Bank, part 
of KfW Group), a number of such programs 
have been implemented in Latin America since 
the mid-1990s, often in cooperation with the 
German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ).  
This article presents some of the results of a 
recent internal evaluation and is an interim step 
towards defining criteria that KfW will apply to 
design and evaluate similar programs in the 
future. Its main emphasis therefore is on how to 
spend funds available for environmental 
services, not on how to raise them. Indirectly, 
however, we also cover the aspect of raising 
funds: only well-designed programs will be able 
to attract financing. 
Overview of PES programs 
The following table gives an overview of the FC 
programs currently underway. In some cases, 
PES-type components are integrated into 
broader conservation or forestry programs, the 
total costs of which are stated.  
 
Country and Region Implementing 
Agency 
FC Contribution to 
Program Costs (in 
US$ million)  
Types of Land Use Promoted Through 
Subsidies 
Honduras / Biosphere Reserve Río 
Plátano 
COHDEFOR 11.5 shade-grown coffee, improved cattle 
pastures 
Costa Rica / Huetar Norte FONAFIFO 12.7 reforestation, protection of existing 
forests, sustainable forest management 
Colombia / Río Magdalena 
Watershed 
FEDERACAFÉ 28.1 reforestation, enrichment planting, natural 
forest regeneration, shade-grown coffee 
Ecuador / Cordillera Chongón-
Colonche 
Fundación Natura 9.6 reforestation, enrichment planting, shade-
grown cocoa and coffee, improved cattle 
pastures, communal forest control 
Ecuador / Biosphere Reserve Gran 
Sumaco 
Ministry of the 
Environment 
9.6 shade-grown cocoa and naranjilla, 
improved cattle pastures, reforestation 
Peru / Jaén – San Ignacio – Bagua INADE / PEJSIB 6.4 shade-grown coffee and cocoa, 
reforestation 
Chile / regions VII. – XI. CONAF 17.9 enrichment planting, sustainable forest 
management 
Paraguay / central and eastern 
region 
DINCAP 9.6 soil conservation (no-till cultivation), 
reforestation, natural forest regeneration 
Dominican Republic / Alto Río 
Yaque del Norte Watershed 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
8.9 reforestation, shade-grown coffee 
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Reflecting different local conditions and types 
of land use promoted, there are wide 
variations between payments per hectare 
and shares of costs assumed by the 
programs and by participating landowners. 
Only one of the programs mentioned here, in 
Costa Rica, co-financed with the World Bank 
and the GEF, is explicitly called a PES 
program. 
 
Potential of Financial Incentives for Land Use 
Change: Quick and Direct Impacts 
With the exception of recipients and their 
lobbying groups, it is difficult to find 
defenders of subsidies. From one end of the 
political spectrum, they are attacked as 
fiscally unsustainable and prone to political 
manipulation. From the other end, they are 
accused of undermining moral suasion and 
self-help processes on communal levels. 
Many more traditional conservationists are 
also reluctant to accept financial concepts in 
a conservation context, either because they 
do not want to debase nature through 
economic valuation or because they fear that 
convincing decision-makers has been difficult 
enough in the past, when they did not know 
that they might bargain for payments.  
However, one might just as well turn around 
the argument against subsidies: in effect, 
today’s landowners are “subsidizing” those 
firms and consumers who are the 
beneficiaries of their ecosystem services. 
PES can be a legitimate and effective policy 
instrument. It can often be more precisely 
targeted at a limited number of objectives 
and priority areas than other instruments, can 
provide clearer incentives to landowners with 
regard to desirable forms of land use, can 
generate results relatively quickly, and 
respect individuals’ rights to make voluntary 
decisions.  
For example, in the Río Magdalena 
watershed of Colombia, there is no other 
instrument through which the Federation of 
Coffee Growers (FEDERACAFÉ) could have 
convinced its members as quickly of the 
benefits of converting marginal coffee lands 
into forest plantations. The social benefits 
(reduced coffee output and improved coffee 
quality at a time of market crisis; watershed, 
soil and biodiversity protection; and social 
stability through alternative incomes) would 
never have come forth on a scale sufficient to 
make such a notable positive difference.  
In Honduras, in the buffer zone of the Río 
Plátano biosphere reserve, there is an urgent 
need to provide alternative income sources to 
stop the advance of the agricultural frontier 
towards the largest remaining forest in 
Central America. Farmers now receive 
financial assistance from the administration 
of the protected area when they undertake 
investments to switch from extensive, 
wasteful land use to sustainable, more 
intensive land use. For example, they receive 
part of the costs of fencing, new grass seeds, 
and shade trees to enable them to produce 
two or more heads of cattle per hectare, 
whereas before they could produce only one.  
In Chile, as part of a campaign to diversify 
the sources of lumber instead of relying on 
monoculture plantations, and to establish a 
culture of sustainable natural forest 
management, small forest owners receive 
subsidies from the Forestry Agency (CONAF) 
to cover part of the initial costs of enrichment 
planting and other silvicultural measures.  
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In the Gran Sumaco Biosphere Reserve, participants 
receive financial incentives for conservation farming 
In none of these cases is it apparent that 
alternative instruments could have produced 
these outcomes on such a broad scale and 
so rapidly. These farmers have not just 
benefited financially (and many of them have 
opened their first bank accounts in the 
process), they have also been accompanied 
by extension workers, learned new technical 
skills, organized themselves, and have come 
to understand that they provide services to 
the outside world for which others are willing 
to compensate them. PES thus became an 
instrument that also helped to integrate 
remote and marginalized regions into the 
mainstream of national development.  
Challenges: Institutional Requirements, 
Sustainability, and Cost Effectiveness 
What then are the potential pitfalls 
encountered in the design and 
implementation of this type of program? PES-
type instruments were originally introduced in 
OECD countries, where they are still primarily 
used.  This is a social context with strong 
institutional capacities and sustained 
willingness to pay to attain environmental and 
agricultural objectives. Whether these 
instruments can be adapted to the conditions 
of “marginal” regions is by no means certain. 
In the analysis of our Latin American PES 
portfolio, we identified three main ways in 
which programs can go wrong: 
- by underestimating the requirements 
of the institutional framework in which 
a PES system will operate, 
- by not clearly spelling out strategies 
to make the desired land use change 
sustainable in the long run, and  
- by not insisting on the most efficient 
mechanisms to deliver environmental 
results. 
In order to understand the institutional 
requirements, one has to consider the typical 
PES-type program setup. Once a farmer’s 
application is accepted, the executing agency 
will sign a contract with him or her, regulating 
the objective (required land use), level and 
sequence of payments, obligations and 
contributions of the farmer, duration, and 
monitoring. The agency’s extension service 
then often has the dual function of advising 
the farmer and monitoring compliance (one 
or both functions are sometimes outsourced, 
which may reduce conflicts of interest).  
While this may appear a simple setup, in 
many rural regions it is beyond local 
capacities. The land tenure situation is often 
far from clear. A “contractual culture” (popular 
acceptance of honoring contractual 
commitments, especially of such a novel 
nature) may not be sufficiently developed. In 
some cases, drop-out rates of participants 
reach 30% or more between the first and 
second payment, and incentive mechanisms 
have to be fine-tuned by asking for 
guarantees etc.  
Extension service workers also have to be 
sufficiently qualified, and adequate structures 
to avoid corruption must be established. 
 5
Otherwise, it is easy to see how farmers and 
officials can collude in approving applications 
and certifying compliance. Some government 
agencies are also legally unable to pay out 
cash subsidies to individuals.  
Especially where payments are “frontloaded” 
(paid out during the first years of a contract 
period), there may also be few possibilities to 
enforce contractual obligations over longer 
periods of time. In fact, the only program 
where this problem appears to have been 
solved satisfactorily seems to be in Costa 
Rica, where the legal system works 
comparatively well and landowners have to 
register the restrictions on their property (for 
up to 20 years) in the public land registry, 
ensuring that they will have to be honored by 
eventual buyers of the land.  
It is also worth remembering what has led to 
the increasing distrust of and backlash 
against subsidies: they are particularly 
susceptible to manipulation by special 
interest groups. There is every reason to 
believe that PES will be subject to the same 
kind of political pressures. The credibility of 
the instrument can be seriously harmed if it is 
not insulated against such processes. 
Interest group pressure may result in the 
allocation of subsidies to non-priority regions, 
to non-priority target groups (for example, 
larger farmers), and in excessive levels of 
payments from which only the well-informed 
and well-connected will benefit – an issue we 
will take up below.  
Considering the issue of contract design, all 
PES-type programs have contracts that might 
be called input-oriented – that is, they spell 
out in relative detail how farmers are to work 
their land – rather than output-oriented – i.e. 
specifying the environmental outcomes or 
services expected from participating farmers. 
Output-oriented programs would leave more 
freedom to farmers in choosing how to reach 
outcomes and might be easier to monitor. For 
example, a biodiversity-oriented PES system 
might link payments to the ongoing presence 
of endangered species on the land, an 
erosion-oriented system to downstream 
sediment loads, a CO2-oriented system to the 
standing biomass on a plot etc. To our 
knowledge, such output-oriented systems 
have not yet been tried out in practice in 
developing countries, probably due to 
perceived monitoring problems.  
 
Paying for biodiversity, carbon sequestration,  
hydrology and aesthetic services – the services identified 
under Costa Rica’s forestry law 
Finally, one important institutional constraint 
is that subsidies must fit into the socio-
cultural environment. Indigenous and other 
communities with strong cooperative bonds 
might be disrupted if individual members start 
receiving cash payments. Common property 
regimes might break down into individualistic, 
open access situations. However, in such 
situations, recipients of payments need not 
be individual farmers. Depending on legal 
frameworks and local practices of decision-
making on natural resource use, they could 
well be farmers’ groups or entire 
communities.  
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In some of the programs supported with funding 
from German FC, group-based incentives are 
being tried out. In the Agro-Environmental 
Program of INADE/PEJSIB in Peru, “Learning and 
Training Groups” are administering incentives and 
distributing them among members. This may lead 
to forms of social control of compliance similar to 
those known from group credit schemes. 
Interestingly, some of the incentives are paid out 
on the basis of competitions between farmers, 
identifying those that have best applied the new 
concepts.  
In the communal forestry component of Fundación 
Natura’s Chongón-Colonche program (Ecuador), 
communities receive contributions to the costs of 
administering their common forest resources. In 
Costa Rica’s PES program, small NGOs are 
acting as intermediaries between FONAFIFO and 
individual farmers in order to simplify procedures 
for participants. In general, we have concluded 
that incentives should be applied at the level 
where decisions are really made. Where forest 
ownership is communal but individual families 
have long-term rights of use, it may be necessary 
to involve both levels in an incentive mechanism. 
Officials of NGOs, local functionaries and 
representatives of indigenous groups often 
argue for channeling resources through their 
institutions instead of directly to farmers. In 
some cases, funds raised for PES have even 
been used for rather traditional “small-scale 
projects” or for social investments unrelated 
to land use. In each case, the benefits of 
strengthening local institutions have to be 
weighed against the transaction costs when 
involving such intermediaries. When asked 
directly, almost every individual farmer in the 
world would strongly argue for direct 
payments.  
The second set of issues mentioned above 
refers to the sustainability of land use 
changes for which incentives are provided. 
Before designing funding mechanisms, a 
serious effort must be made to identify those 
technological packages or “Best 
Management Practices” that can deliver the 
desired environmental outcomes with the 
least costs to landowners and society. 
Having selected the most appropriate 
packages, the question arises under what 
conditions farmers will be able to adopt and 
sustain these new land uses. This mainly 
depends on how long it takes the new land 
use to become competitive or to break even 
compared to the traditional or next best use 
of the land.  
In a highly simplified framework, the financial 
perspectives of a farmer considering the 
adoption of a new technology or land use, 
and of an agency considering how to support 
this decision, could be classified as follows:  
 
 farmer’s perspective:  
new land use is… 
agency’s perspective:  
adoption should be promoted through…  
A of immediate commercial interest  technical advisory services 
B self-sustaining after short adoption period financing of adoption costs through credits 
C self-sustaining after longer adoption period and/or in 
the absence of functioning capital market 
financing of adoption costs through subsidies 
D permanently requires subsidies to remain 
competitive (e.g. protection of primary forests)  
caution advisable – will agency have permanent 
sources of funding? 
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In case “A” situations, where no major 
investments are necessary or the break-even 
point is reached quickly and only lack of 
access to information limits the adoption of 
new practices, no need for financing arises. 
In case “B” situations, the new land use can 
break even within two or three years and 
farmers are willing and able to obtain credits 
to finance the associated investment costs. In 
case “C”, investments are larger, new crops 
are slower in delivering benefits, and the 
local capital market is not sufficiently 
developed to provide financing for investment 
and opportunity costs. This is a typical 
situation in many rural regions with respect to 
the introduction of tree crops, reforestation 
and similar land uses, and it is the classic 
field of PES-type programs.  
In most Latin American contexts, it is unlikely 
that substantial levels of PES can be 
maintained from public budgets or that local 
financing mechanisms will be firmly 
established after some years. As a general 
rule, therefore, externally financed programs 
should only promote land uses that become 
financially self-sustaining for landowners 
before payments stop. There is only one 
case “D” in German Financial Cooperation: 
the PES system in Costa Rica, which is 
financing the protection of primary forests 
and requires permanent subsidies. This is the 
only case involving a credible strategy for 
mobilizing additional funds after German 
support runs out, and Costa Rica has also 
contractually committed to reinvest in the 
PES program any later proceeds it may 
receive, as a result of the German financing, 
through the Clean Development Mechanism.  
 
It is sometimes argued that (subsidized) loan 
schemes are a more promising alternative than 
cash subsidies since they involve a more 
permanent relationship with local institutions, can 
be used to establish rotating credit funds etc. 
However, the international experience with respect 
to credit programs for agriculture and forestry is 
quite disappointing. Especially credit schemes 
organized by projects have often led to low 
repayment rates and high transaction costs. The 
resulting breakdowns of credit funds not only 
endanger project results with respect to land use, 
but also cause conflicts in communities and 
undermine the gradual emergence of formal 
capital markets.  
Since the underlying economics for the farmer of 
the introduction of a new land use is independent 
of the funding mechanism, and the subsidy 
element of the credit would have to be the same 
as for a subsidy paid out directly, we have 
concluded that it is generally preferable to avoid 
the additional transaction costs of setting up credit 
schemes.  
To ensure sustainability of land use changes, 
there has to be a strong element of self 
selection by farmers. They will usually have a 
much better idea of the specific 
characteristics of their farm and household 
than any institution running a PES program. 
PES programs should therefore be “supply-
driven”: the suppliers of environmental 
services, i.e. farmers, need to guide the 
programs and demonstrate their interest and 
their belief in the advantages of the new land 
use through substantive contributions to the 
adoption costs, usually provided in the form 
of land, labor and local materials. Otherwise, 
there is a strong risk that new land uses will 
be established temporarily and abandoned 
immediately after subsidy payments run out.  
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Some people will not accept this 
interpretation of the instrument – transitional 
subsidies to catalyze and speed up 
technology transfer – as PES. They argue 
that we should only talk of PSE where 
payments are continuous and open-ended 
and that sustainability should be established 
at the level of the PES system: tapping 
permanent sources of funding for permanent 
subsidies.  
 
Introducing shade-grown cocoa in Ecuador’s  
Cordillera Chongón-Colonche 
In our view, in developing countries this is a 
realistic option only where the value of the 
environmental service is exceptionally high. 
In most cases, the appropriate way to use 
PES will be to finance temporary campaigns 
to change land use patterns in specific 
regions, after which costly implementation 
structures can and should be dismantled: 
“The most defensible case for subsidies is for 
the transfer of profitable technologies to 
growers who lack experience using them” 
(Hueth 1995). Coincidentally, this also fits 
much better than permanent programs with 
the time horizons and project cycles of 
international development agencies or private 
sector investors.  
 
In order to maximize the ecological impacts 
of funds available for PES, systems should 
also be as cost-effective as possible. PES 
will quickly lose its appeal as an instrument of 
environmental policy if it is perceived to be 
overloaded with other objectives, especially 
social objectives, at the expense of its 
environmental impact.  
For example, it is not generally desirable to 
compensate farmers for legal restrictions on 
land uses that already exist and that can be 
enforced by the state. Only where new 
restrictions cannot be introduced otherwise – 
for example, where a new protected area 
would restrict traditional grazing rights and is 
politically impossible to establish without 
compensation – should PES be considered. 
While everybody has sympathy for a poor 
farmer, there are other instruments much 
better suited for addressing rural poverty. 
The attractiveness and credibility of PES for 
taxpayers and others asked to contribute 
funds depends not on its ability to redistribute 
income but rather on its ability to effectively 
change environmental outcomes by changing 
individual land use decisions.  
It is sometimes hard to convince program 
administrators that PES programs should pay 
as little as possible to individual farmers. One 
argument that must be overcome is that 
farmers should be compensated according to 
the value of the environmental benefits they 
produce. This is similar to arguing that when 
buying a car, one should pay the car 
company the value of the expected 
transportation services. It is certainly useful 
to estimate the value of the environmental 
services to society, but only to establish an 
upper limit - if society had to pay the entire 
value or even more, it would not benefit from 
the transaction.  
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Another misleading argument is that farmers 
should be paid the exact amount of the costs 
arising from changing the land use. For an 
agency executing a PES program, it is 
impossible to determine individual costs with 
any degree of accuracy. Even approaching 
the level of information that farmers have 
would incur unreasonable costs. 
Furthermore, this is similar to arguing that 
when buying a car, one should first find out 
how much it cost the car company to produce 
the car and then compensate the company 
by exactly that amount. Again, it is certainly 
useful when defining payment levels to have 
a general understanding of the economic 
situation of farmers in the region, but any 
attempt to establish costs for every farm and 
crop is bound to fail.  
 
Maintaining an algarrobo plantation in the dry forest zone 
In our view, the approach by some agencies 
to attempt to precisely identify adoption costs 
sometimes also reflects a paternalistic 
understanding that farmers need to be 
protected from making wrong decisions. Of 
course, adoption of new technologies is risky. 
Agencies have a responsibility to reduce the 
risk where they can, especially by designing 
appropriate technological packages and 
providing adequate information to farmers. 
This is particularly important if smaller 
farmers are targeted, who are generally more 
risk-averse and slower to adopt new land 
uses.  
But risks to farmers are usually limited – if the 
new technology fails to deliver economic 
benefits, they can revert to the traditional 
technology. And it may actually be possible 
to design PES-like mechanisms that only 
render payments when the new land use 
does not turn out to be economically 
beneficial to the farmer. Farmers could be 
insured, for example, against the risk that 
they will not receive a specified minimum 
price in the market for a new product. The 
Nature Conservancy, for example, is 
currently working on an interesting 
transitional risk insurance program in the 
Brazilian cerrado. 
The desire of administrators for programs to 
succeed often drives them to establish levels 
of payments at which large numbers of 
farmers are willing to participate and the 
supply of environmental services is larger 
than the demand they can buy with existing 
budgets. For example, in several years the 
Costa Rican PES program had more than 
three times more applicants than could be 
accepted. The incentives are obvious: 
administrators can argue for larger budgets, 
and they get to decide which farmers will be 
accepted. As with any bureaucracy, this 
discretionary margin may be used wisely, 
preferring farms with added environmental 
benefits. But it may also lead to rent-seeking 
behavior and corrupt practices.  
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Self-selection by farmers brings better results  
than selection by project administrators 
In general, paying more than is necessary is 
wasteful in terms of program objectives, it 
creates dependencies and frustrates farmers 
unable to participate, even up to a point – 
especially if allocation practices are unfair, 
corrupt or not transparent - where they will 
attempt to deliberately undermine the 
program’s objectives. 
Some simple microeconomic considerations 
show that there are generally two steps to 
reduce payments to farmers: first, subsidy 
levels can be chosen to “clear the market for 
environmental services.” At the equilibrium 
level, the demand for and the supply of 
hectares for participation in the program 
should be equal. Since the PES agency does 
not know the supply curve, i.e. the marginal 
costs to farmers for participating, it would 
have to approach the equilibrium price by 
trial-and-error and/or by conducting farm-
level studies on costs and willingness-to-
participate.  
But even at the equilibrium level, the PES 
agency is still paying more than necessary. A 
second step towards cost-efficiency would be 
to differentiate payments. This is possible 
since farmers can only contract with the PES 
agency, as the only buyer of environmental 
services or “monopsonist”, and each hectare 
has a different marginal cost or supply price. 
A farmer operating on poor lands far away 
from the market will face relatively low 
opportunity costs when participating in a 
reforestation program. He will be interested in 
participating even if he only receives a small 
payment.  
By differentiating payments, the PES agency 
would ideally eliminate all producers’ rents 
(payments farmers receive above the level 
necessary to induce participation in the 
program). It would also avoid the problem of 
establishing plantations on prime agricultural 
land. The agency could then invest the 
savings from optimizing the PES scheme in 
buying more environmental services, i.e. 
including more hectares in the program.  
 
Preparing cocoa seedlings for an  
agroforestry promotion program 
Differentiation would likely involve an 
auctioning process, where farmers can 
submit bids or offers for participating in the 
program, thus revealing their supply price, 
and the PES agency would first contract with 
the lowest bidders. Strategic behavior by 
sellers of environmental services can be 
reduced by appropriate auction design. Such 
relatively sophisticated allocation and pricing 
procedures have not yet been sufficiently 
tested in practice; the only country with 
extensive experience in auctioning 
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participation in agro-environmental subsidy 
programs appears to be the USA.  
PES agencies have often been reluctant to 
try to improve the cost-effectiveness of 
programs. They may lack the economic 
know-how, they may argue that improved 
procedures are simply too complicated or 
unusual in the socio-cultural context of rural 
regions, or they may point out the political 
difficulties in reducing subsidies once 
everybody has become used to them, or in 
paying different subsidies to different 
recipients. While we accept that simple 
approaches have important benefits, some of 
this reluctance appears to be due to the rent-
seeking environment in which agencies 
operate, which provides strong incentives to 
maintain relatively high and uniform 
payments.  
Outlook 
The challenge in the years ahead is to further 
develop the instrument of PES on the basis 
of the lessons learnt so far. In order to make 
financing PES programs attractive to their 
own taxpayers, to official donors, or to private 
sector actors – be they CDM investors, water 
companies, or conservation NGOs - 
developing country governments and PES 
agencies will need to demonstrate that their 
proposals take into consideration the issues 
raised in this review – institutional 
requirements, sustainability and cost-
effectiveness.  
 
The case for strict targeting, monitoring and 
differentiation of subsidies has also been made in 
the context of trade policy, where agricultural 
subsidies have become one of the major 
stumbling blocks: “The blunter the green pricing 
instrument – in the extreme, all farmers would 
receive identical green payments per hectare or 
per unit of commodity production – the more the 
whole enterprise looks like (and probably is) a 
crude attempt to subsidize domestic farming 
regardless of the impacts on international trade” 
(Randall 2003).  
Many institutions are currently considering 
how to scale up local pilot initiatives. The 
larger PES programs become, the more 
responsibility program designers will also 
have with respect to their impacts on land 
markets (substantial subsidies will rapidly be 
reflected in land prices), agricultural 
production, public budgets and 
macroeconomic parameters.  
The instrument of PES is promising enough 
to warrant a closer look in other regions, 
particularly in Asia where high population 
densities and strong economic development 
are raising the value of environmental 
services in many regions. In times of tight 
public budgets, we also need feedback from 
developing countries to improve the 
efficiency of PES-type programs in OECD 
countries. One conclusion that may be of 
particular interest in this context is that 
temporary PES campaigns, designed to 
introduce new land uses that are 
environmentally friendly and economically 
profitable, may hold the greatest promise. 
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